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Non-technical summary
In the last decade, the domestic U.S airline industry has experienced a pronounced consolidation trend reflected in three high-profile mergers and the demise of several smaller players such as ATA Airlines or National Airlines. The only significant countervailing force was the market entry and growth of JetBlue Airways. Since its first market appearance in we find that non-stop fares are on average about 21 percent lower post-entry; however, the magnitude of the price effect depends on the pre-entry market structure. While entry into monopoly markets triggered an average price decrease of about 25 percent, the respective average price drop for entries into oligopoly markets lied at about 15 percent. Based on additional estimates of the price and income elasticities for long-haul domestic U.S. flights, we are able to calculate that JetBlue's long-haul entries alone led to an increase in consumer welfare of about USD 661 million, only referring to the effects in the first year after the respective entry events. Our empirical analysis reveals further that although the largest percentage price decreases are observed for entries in monopoly markets, the largest absolute increases in consumer welfare are realized by entries in oligopoly markets.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Im Laufe des vergangenen Jahrzehnts war in der US-amerikanischen Luftverkehrsindustrie 
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) published a report on the `low-cost airline service revolution'. Although the report clearly identifies low-cost carriers as the rising stars of the U.S. airline industry, it also expects a certain co-existence between network carriers -focusing on long-haul and international network markets -and low-cost carriersfocusing on short-and medium-haul point-to-point markets (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1997) .
Almost fifteen years after the drafting of the DOT report, the low-cost airline service revolution has not only continued -reflected in an increase of the domestic passenger market share from 13 percent in 1997 to 28 percent in 2009 -but recently also experienced a paradigm shift with low-cost carriers starting to enter long-haul airline markets above 1,500 miles on a larger scale. For example, while in 1997 none of the long-haul non-stop routes in the largest 1,000 U.S. domestic markets was served by a low-cost carrier, route overlap From an economic perspective, the introduction of significant low-cost carrier services in long-haul markets in general and the appearance and growth of JetBlue Airways in particular creates an appealing environment for an econometric study on the effects of entry for at least two reasons. First, the existing empirical evidence on the effects of low-cost carrier entry in short-and medium-haul markets suggests that consumers gain substantially from entry and competition by low-cost carriers in long-haul routes. Second, it can be expected that the recent market developments will put additional pressure on the revenue and net income situation of network carriers probably triggering a further shakeout in the industry in the medium and long run.
Against this background, the paper estimates the effects of entry by JetBlue Airways in long-haul domestic U.S. airline markets. Based on publicly available traffic and fare data from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) we constructed a quarterly panel data set which covers non-directional domestic U.S. airport-pairs from 1995 to 2009. We find that non-stop fares were on average about 21 percent lower post-entry; however, the magnitude of the price effect depends on the pre-entry market structure. While JetBlue's entry into monopoly markets triggered an average price decrease of about 25 percent, the respective average price drop for entries into oligopoly markets lied at about 15 percent. Based on additional estimates of the price and income elasticities for long-haul domestic U.S. flights, we are able to calculate that JetBlue's long-haul entries alone led to an increase in consumer welfare of about USD 661 million (in 1995 dollars) only referring to the effects in the first year after the respective entry events. Our empirical analysis reveals further that although the largest percentage price decreases are observed for entries in monopoly markets, the largest absolute increases in consumer welfare are realized by entries in oligopoly markets.
The paper is structured as follows. The second section provides a brief review of existing evidence on the effects of entry in U.S. airline markets, followed by the provision of some background information on JetBlue Airways in general and their patterns and effects of entry in particular in the third section. The subsequent fourth section estimates the price effects of entry by JetBlue Airways. An estimation of the general price effects of entry in short-, medium-and long-haul markets (using a fixed-effects panel data model) is followed by a more narrow estimation approach which concentrates on the effects of entries in monopolistic and oligopolistic long-haul markets. The fifth section derives a consumer welfare estimate for long-haul entries by JetBlue Airways. Based on a description of our empirical approach in Section 5.1, a further fixed-effects panel data model is applied to estimate the price and income elasticities for long-haul domestic U.S. flights in Section 5.2. Merging the results of both sections subsequently allows the calculation of the compensating variation for each of the existing non-stop long-haul markets entered by JetBlue. Section 6 concludes the paper by reviewing the key results and discussing important policy implications.
THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY IN U.S. AIRLINE MARKETS
The liberalization of the U.S. airline industry in 1978 together with the availability of (routelevel) traffic and fare data collected by the U.S. Department of Transportation provides a fruitful environment for empirical research. With respect to market entry, existing research can broadly be subdivided into two strands: the 'determinants of entry' literature and the 'effects of entry' literature. While the former set of papers investigates the key drivers of airline's decisions to enter particular routes by either estimating structural models (see, e.g., Berry (1992) , Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Dunn (2008) ) or -following an reduced form approach -estimating the likelihood of entry as a function of firm and market characteristics (see, e.g., Boguslaski et al. (2004) , Lederman and Januszewski (2003) , Sinclair (1995) ), the 'effects of entry' literature can be subdivided further into studies of the general effects of entry and studies with a particular focus on the incumbent's reactions to entry (see, e.g., Daraban and Fournier (2008) , Goolsbee and Syverson (2008) , Lin et al. (2002) ). Given the focus of this paper on the general effects of entry, the remainder of this section will concentrate on a review of papers belonging to this sub-set of literature.
The earlier studies on the general effects of entry basically investigate the impact of route entries of particular low-cost carriers on fares and passenger numbers. In addition to studies that concentrate on the direct price and quantity effects of (low-cost) entry, several studies took a broader perspective and investigate the impact of low-cost carriers on airport and route competition. Most prominently, the study by Dresner et al. (1996) extends previous research by analyzing the impact of low-cost entry on, first, carriers operating on other routes at the airport where entry occurred and, second, the impact of lowcost entry on carriers operating at airports in close proximity to the airport where entry occurred. The authors find that low-cost carrier entry on a route caused significant spill-over effects on both types of adjacent routes in a range of 8 to 45 percent lower average fares (for the case of Southwest Airlines). These results suggest that the real consumer benefits of lowcost carrier entry and competition are significantly larger than previously thought by focusing on the direct effects of entry in the respective airport-pairs. Dresner et al.'s (1996) approach to actually estimate the consumer savings of the presence of Southwest Airlines in U.S. airline markets. Based on an original set of competition variables, he finds that the savings due to actual, adjacent, and potential competition from Southwest sum up to USD 12.9 billion. Southwest's low fares were directly responsible for USD 3.4 billion of these savings to passengers. The remaining USD 9.5 billion represents the effect that actual, adjacent, and potential competition from Southwest had on other carriers' fares. These savings amount to 20 percent of the airline industry's 1998 domestic scheduled passenger revenue and slightly more than half the fare reductions attributed to airline deregulation.
Morrison (2001) builds on
In addition to contributions that investigate the route-level entry effects of particular carriers, several studies provide a broader perspective. In a rather descriptive paper, Joskow et al. (1994) examine quarterly data for 27 major, non-stop city pairs in the US between 1985 and 1987 and generally find that entry reduces fares and increases output. In particular, the authors conclude that entry reduced yield by on average about 9.2 percent and led to a corresponding increase in the number of passengers of about 56 percent. However, Joskow et al. (1994) further find that entry generally is not induced by price levels substantially above the norm. adding a third network carrier has no significant further effect on fares. Interestingly, the authors also find that the small competitive effect of entry by legacy carriers is a fairly recent phenomenon and might be explained by, first, the widening price discipline resulting from lower LCC costs and rapid LCC expansion, second, the greater price transparency due to Internet-based airline search; and, third, changes in corporate buying patterns and travel policies.
Given this short foray through the existing literature, our paper aims at contributing to the case-based strand of research. In addition to the provision of new evidence on the effects of entry by the innovative new low-cost carrier JetBlue Airways, we specifically make use of the availability of route-level panel data to estimate the average effects of entry by JetBlue from inception in 2000 up to the end of 2009. Furthermore, we are able to provide more specific insights on the impact of JetBlue entries by estimating models which include a differentiation in short-, medium-, and long-haul markets on the one hand and a differentiation in monopoly and oligopoly markets (with or without the presence of other low-cost carriers pre-entry) on the other hand. These results will provide the basis for the estimation of the consumer welfare effects of entry by JetBlue Airways in long-haul markets in Section 5.
THE ENTRY AND GROWTH OF JETBLUE AIRWAYS
This section aims at providing some background information on the market entry and growth of JetBlue Airways. In particular, after a brief general characterization of JetBlue Airways in Section 3.1, the subsequent Section 3.2 focuses on the presentation and discussion of anecdotal evidence on its patterns and effects of entry. Although JetBlue is usually classified as low-cost carrier, its business strategy has several specific characteristics. First, the airline provides high quality service in several important service dimensions, such as in-flight entertainment and pre-assigned leather seats with more legroom. Second, JetBlue does not only concentrate -like most other low-cost carriers -on short-and medium-haul markets, but also entered long-haul markets. Third, JetBlue has recently started entering into alliance agreements with foreign and domestic network carriers 1 A focus city is typically defined as a location that is not a hub, but from which the airline has non-stop flights to several destinations other than its hubs. Complementary to the low-cost-low-fare approach, JetBlue offers a high quality product as confirmed, e.g., by the Airline Quality Rating (AQR) Scores 7 , which always show a top rank for JetBlue Airways in both the entire group of major airlines, and the sub-group of low-cost airlines since its first appearance in the rating in 2003.
A BRIEF CHARACTERIZATION OF JETBLUE

PATTERNS AND EFFECTS OF ENTRY BY JETBLUE AIRWAYS
Given the brief general characterization of JetBlue Airways as a rather untypical low-cost carrier, this section narrows the focus down to the patterns and effects of entry by JetBlue of JetBlue Airways will likely lead to a further convergence -basically because the number of (potentially profitable) long-haul market entries is limited -the focus of JetBlue Airways on long-haul routes in its first years of existence is clearly reflected in the data.
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Given this initial description of the patterns of entry by JetBlue Airways together with the characterization of JetBlue's business strategy in the preceding section suggests a first quick
On-time performance (OT), denied boardings (DB), mishandled baggage (MB) and customer complaints (CC). The AQR is derived by Wichita State University (now in cooperation with Purdue University). look on the effects of entry. In this respect, previous research showed that the introduction of low-cost carrier competition in short-and medium-haul markets typically led to substantial average price reductions. Given the minor role of low-cost carrier competition in long-haul markets before the entry of JetBlue, it can therefore be expected that comparable price reductions are observed in long-haul markets. Although the econometric analysis below will provide detailed answers to this question, the example of JetBlue's entry in the New York JFK-Seattle route shown in Figure 2 already provides first anecdotal evidence. 
ESTIMATING THE PRICE EFFECTS OF ENTRY BY JETBLUE AIRWAYS
Based on the characterization of the business strategy of JetBlue Airways and the presentation of first anecdotal evidence on the effects of entry in the preceding section, this section aims at estimating the price effects of entry by JetBlue Airways. After describing the data set in the subsequent section, we first estimate the general price effects of entry by JetBlue Airways in short-, medium-and long-haul markets. Given the minor role of low-cost carrier competition in long-haul markets before the entry of JetBlue Airways, we expect a larger percentage fare reduction due to entry in such markets compared to short-and medium-haul markets in which several generations of low-cost carriers have been active since the liberalization of the airline industry in 1978. In a second step, we narrow the focus down to the entries of JetBlue Airways in long-haul markets and estimate the price effects of entry by separating between three types of pre-entry market structures: monopoly, oligopoly without low-cost carrier presence and oligopoly with low-cost carrier presence. Given the insights provided by standard oligopoly theory, we expect to find larger price reductions for entries into monopoly markets compared to entries into more competitive oligopoly markets.
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA SET
The empirical analysis is based on data sets from several sources. 
In order to measure the relative effect, the dependent variable y it is the logarithm of the non- Marginal effects with respect to route distance can be found in Table 2 . A description and summary statistics of all variables included in the empirical analysis can be found in Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix. Our regressions show that non-stop prices decrease by 15 percent (27 USD) on average after JetBlue entered a route. The effects are largest for entries into long-haul markets leading to fare decreases of on average 27 percent (76 USD). For short-haul routes, the price decrease is found to be 19 percent, while the effects of entry into medium-haul markets are not significantly different from zero. As shown further by the regression analysis, fares are highest in monopoly markets and lowest in oligopoly markets with competitive pressure of low-cost carriers. Furthermore, cost reductions through larger aircrafts or higher load factors are translated into lower fares. One additional seat in the aircraft lowers the price by 7 cents while an increase in the average load factor of one percentage point lowers the fares by 54 cents; flying under Chapter 11 protection lowers the fare by 4 percent or 10 USD, 13 respectively. The regressions furthermore confirm seasonality of air fares and a common downward trend in prices over the past 15 years.
In a nutshell, the empirical results in this section support the significance of market entry of JetBlue Airways in general and the importance of entry into long-haul markets in particular even when controlling for other effects on prices within an econometric framework.
THE PRICE EFFECTS OF ENTRY IN MONOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY LONG-HAUL
MARKETS
In this section, we narrow the focus down to the entries of JetBlue Airways in long-haul markets and estimate the price effects of entry by separating between three types of pre-entry market structures: monopoly, oligopoly without low-cost carrier presence and oligopoly with low-cost carrier presence.
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Given the insights provided by standard oligopoly theory, we expect to find larger price reductions for entries into monopoly markets compared to entries into more competitive oligopoly markets.
The model specification is similar to the approach conducted in Section 4.2 except that we now allow the price effect of entry to differ with respect to the market structure before or in the absence of JetBlue Airways. The model specification becomes 
We interact the indicator variable of JetBlue serving a route i in time t with the type of the market before JetBlue entered the route. ON it becomes one if the market is an oligopoly market of network carriers only while OL it takes the value of one if the market is an oligopoly market with at least one low-cost carrier as competitor. Thus, monopoly markets serve as reference category. We expect b 2 and b 3 to be positive. Table 3 depicts the results of the fixed effects regressions. Summary statistics of the variables included for the estimation of the coefficients of equation 2 can also be found in Table 8 in the Appendix. Marginal effects of JetBlue entry events on non-stop long-haul fares with respect to market structure are presented in Table 4 . The largest effect on prices can be observed for entries in monopoly markets. If JetBlue enters a monopoly route of a competitor, non-stop air fares decrease by 25 percent on average. The effect is smaller if entry takes place in oligopolistic markets. On average, we observe an 18 percent drop in prices for entries into oligopolies of network carriers and a drop of on average 13 percent in oligopolies in which at least one low-cost carrier was active in the quarter before the entry of JetBlue Airways. The effects of the control variables are by and large of the same size as in the analysis in Section 4.2. However, the common price effects over the years and the effect of Chapter 11 protection on fares seem to be larger in long-haul markets.
ESTIMATING THE CONSUMER WELFARE EFFECTS OF ENTRY BY JETBLUE AIRWAYS IN LONG-HAUL MARKETS
The estimations of the general price effects of entry by JetBlue Airways in the preceding section already provided important insights into the general consumer welfare effects of entry.
However, although it is straightforward to assume that consumer surplus raises with Merging the results of both sections subsequently allows the calculation of the compensating variation for each of the existing non-stop long-haul markets entered by JetBlue Airways.
DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPIRICAL APPROACH
In his seminal paper, Hausman (1981) developed exact measures of welfare changes for simple demand specifications. He especially showed that knowledge of the Marshallian demand function is sufficient to measure the consumer welfare effects of price changes expressed in either the compensating variation (CV) or the equivalent variation (EV).
Focusing on the compensating variation in the remainder of this paper, it is basically defined as the amount of money which must be taken from the consumer after a price drop in order to make him as well off as he was in the initial situation.
In order estimate the consumer welfare effects of JetBlue's entries into existing long-haul markets, we follow the basic approach introduced by Hausman (1981) and successfully applied by several studies (see e.g. Brynjolfsson et al., 2003; Hausman et al., 1997) . For the case of a log-linear demand function, which is usually assumed for empirical studies of the airline industry (see, e.g., Gillen et al. (2003) ), the compensating variation is then given by
with p 0 and p 1 and q 0 and q 1 being the non-stop fare and number of passengers before and after JetBlue's entry. The variable y 0 denotes income, a is the price elasticity of demand, and δ is the income elasticity of demand. In the following, we follow equation 3 and estimate the consumer welfare effects of entry by, first, estimating the price and income elasticities for long-haul U.S. domestic flights and, second, deriving the desired estimate of the overall welfare effects of entry by JetBlue Airways.
ESTIMATION OF THE PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR LONG-HAUL FLIGHTS
A precondition for an application of Hausman's (1981) expression for the compensating variation is the estimation of price and income elasticities. In a review of prior studies on air travel demand elasticities in various countries, Gillen et al. (2003) differentiate between different market segments (short-and long-haul, domestic and international, business and leisure) and find for the segment long-haul domestic business a range of values for own-price elasticities of demand from -1.428 and -0.836 (Median: -1.15) and for the segment long-haul domestic leisure a range of values from -1.228 and -0.787 (Median: -1.104). Given the similar results for the business and leisure segments, we refrain from separating both groups in our estimation below.
With respect to income elasticities, prior research by, e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) suggests that income elasticities can be ignored for typical consumer products where purchases are a small fraction of the consumer's annual income. However, as this assumption might not hold for air travel, an estimate of the income elasticity of demand should be included into the derivation of the consumer welfare effects of entry. Again referring to the study by Gillen et al. (2003) , they find a median income elasticity across all market segments and countries of 1.390, however, with a large variation between the studies reaching from -1.21 to 11.58.
Based on this review of existing empirical evidence, we make use of the data set described above to estimate price and income elasticities of long-haul domestic U.S. air travel demand.
In contrast to the analyses in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we examine both demand for non-stop and multiple stop connections. This extension -compared to our focus on non-stop services so far -increases the number of long-haul markets between the 100 largest MSAs from 298 markets to 1,015 markets (see Table 8 ).
Since Hausman's (1981) expression of the compensating variation assumes a constant elasticity specification of the demand curve, we apply the following fixed-effects regression model:
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of total origin-destination passengers as reported by the DB1B market data. Long-haul demand is explained by the average fare p it (one-and multiple-stop fares) and average income inc it within the two MSAs. Total demand is further influenced by a set of variables Z it which include potential demand (population), unemployment, and dominance of one carrier at a particular airport. As in the previous regressions, we control for seasonality and a common trend. The regression results are presented in Table 5 . A detailed description of the variables and summary statistics can be found in Tables 7 and 8 in the Appendix. Data and DB1B Origin and Destination Survey, U.S. Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics, authors' calculations. As shown in Table 5 , the own-price elasticity of demand for long-haul domestic flights is estimated to -0.722 while the respective income elasticity is 0.415. Comparing our results with the value spectrum of the Gillen et al. (2003) study reported above reveals that our ownprice elasticity estimate is at the lower end of the range of values. The estimate of the income elasticity shows the expected positive sign, however, is clearly below the median value of 1.390 reported above. However, the fact that the values collected by Gillen et al. (2003) stem from various studies referring to different market segments and countries might explain a significant part of this divergence. For the estimation of the consumer welfare effects of entry by JetBlue Airways in long-haul markets in the following section, we apply our estimates of own-price and income elasticities reported in Table 5 above.
ESTIMATION OF THE CONSUMER WELFARE EFFECTS
Given the description of our empirical approach and the estimation of price and income elasticities for long-haul flights, this section brings both previous sections together to estimate the consumer welfare effects of entry of JetBlue Airways in 21 existing long-haul domestic U.S. airline markets. We derive our results on an aggregate basis distinguishing the three market structures monopoly, oligopoly with low-cost carrier presence and oligopoly without low-cost carrier presence. Following Brynjolfsson et al. (2003) , the fare after JetBlue's entry Table 6 . As shown in Table 6 , the overall change in consumer welfare measured by the compensating variation can be estimated to USD 661 million only referring to the effects of long-haul entry by JetBlue Airways in the first year after the respective entry events. As revealed further by Table 6 , the contribution of entries into oligopoly markets without low-cost carrier presence is the largest with USD 261 million (about 40 percent), followed by entries into monopoly markets with consumer savings of USD 234 million (about 35 percent) and entries into oligopoly markets with low-cost carrier presence with USD 166 million (about 25 percent).
However, it is important for the interpretation of these results to remind that the number of entries is not shared equally between the three different pre-entry market structures. While 12 of the 21 long-haul entries of JetBlue Airways took place in monopoly markets, 7 were observed in oligopoly markets without low-cost carrier presence and only 2 into the remaining category of entry into oligopoly markets with low-cost carrier presence. On an `average effect per entry' basis, it becomes apparent that the two entries into oligopoly markets with low-cost carrier presence realized the by far largest absolute contribution in consumer welfare of about USD 83 million, followed by entries into oligopolies without lowcost carrier presence with USD 37 million and entry into monopoly markets with about USD 20 million. It can therefore be concluded that although entering monopoly markets causes the largest percentage price reductions, the average consumer welfare effects of entry are substantially larger for entries into denser oligopoly markets. Interestingly, the largest absolute increases in consumer welfare are realized by JetBlue's entries into the most competitive markets -Boston-Los Angeles and New York JFK-Los Angeles -in which not only network carriers but also another low-cost carrier was already present at the time of entry of JetBlue Airways.
Although our estimation approach follows an accepted procedure successfully applied in other studies, several specificities should be mentioned to put the findings into perspective. First, our estimates only refer to existing long-haul markets and therefore only cover half of the 42 long-haul entries of JetBlue Airways. Although it is reasonable to assume that the 21 new markets entered by JetBlue Airways are of smaller size, it is obvious that an additional consumer surplus is realized by these entries. Second, one has to remember that we concentrated on long-haul entries by JetBlue Airways only. Thus, our estimates do not include obvious consumer welfare gains of entries in short-and medium-haul markets.
Although it can generally be expected that (price) competition is already tougher in these markets, our estimation results from above revealed that potential market size rather than the number of competitors seems to be the key driver of the absolute consumer welfare effects of entry. As a consequence, it can be expected that especially entry by JetBlue Airways into several dense medium-haul markets from New York JFK to Florida created substantial additional consumer welfare effects. Third, by analyzing the effects of entry on an airport-pair basis, we ignore possible effects of entries by JetBlue Airways on adjacent routes. Although it is rather difficult to estimate such effects, the results by Morrison (2001) for Southwest Airlines suggest that it is very likely that the inclusion of such spill-over effects would increase the consumer surplus estimate quite substantially. however, the magnitude of the price effect depends on the pre-entry market structure. While entry into monopoly markets triggered an average price decrease of about 25 percent, the respective average price drop for entries into oligopoly markets lied at about 15 percent.
Based on additional estimates of the price and income elasticities for long-haul domestic U.S. flights, we are able to calculate that JetBlue's long-haul entries alone led to an increase in consumer welfare of about USD 661 million, only referring to the effects in the first year after the respective entry events. Our empirical analysis reveals further that although the largest percentage price decreases are observed for entries in monopoly markets, the largest absolute increases in consumer welfare are realized by entries in oligopoly markets.
Turning from the quantitative results of the paper to a discussion of their implications for the evolution of the U.S. airline industry, it can be expected that the low-cost-high-quality strategy of JetBlue Airways will put additional pressure on the revenue and net income situation of the network carriers particularly in long-haul markets. In the medium and longrun, these developments might trigger a further shakeout among the network carriers. Such a scenario becomes even more likely if the recent market entry of Virgin America is taken into account. This new entrant not only follows a similar low-cost-high-quality strategy but also focuses on long-haul coast-to-coast markets. Although Virgin will put additional pressure on network carriers it will also have to directly compete against JetBlue in many long-haul markets and will therefore put the sustainability of the entire low-cost-high-quality business strategy to the test. JetBlue Airways alone will constrain the market power of these mega-airlines and will secure at least a significant fraction of the benefits of deregulation and competition in the U.S. airline industry. Nevertheless, the antitrust authority should be aware of the substantial value of lowcost carriers for competition in the domestic U.S. airline industry. As a consequence, it is crucial to constantly monitor the industry and to foreclose serious attempts of network carriers to reduce or even eliminate competitive pressure. Such an active antitrust policy is especially necessary for both proposed acquisitions of 'maverick' low-cost carriers by network carriers as well as attempts by network carriers to apply instruments out of the tool box of 
APPENDIX
